This article explores the cognitive dimension of climate change policy making in Brazil and the United States as both countries prepare for the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or COP15 in Copenhagen. The comparative policy analysis is framed by Putnam (1988) and informed by Bazerman (2009), but adapted to explore the cognitive expressions of policymaking through investigation of public opinion, newspaper coverage, and policymaker statements. The analysis reveals key differences in the ways that Brazilian and U.S. citizens, journalists, and policymakers understand global warming and climate change and think through the policy alternatives for addressing this global challenge through national policy and international negotiations. Brazil's cognitive dimension provides its negotiators with a wide range of strategic positions, allowing this country to play the role of dealmaker. The U.S. administration arrives at Copenhagen with a narrow win-set, limited by the discordant and divisive cognitive expressions that surround policymaking. These differences limit bilateral cooperation and complicate the COP15 negotiations.
Introduction
Brazil and the United States are poised to play key roles at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or COP15 in Copenhagen and the negotiations over a post-Kyoto Protocol regime to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The COP15 promises to focus the world's attention upon the global challenge to move toward a low carbon energy economy.
Next to U.S. -China energy and climate change policy cooperation (LIEBERTHAL; SANDALOW, 2009; PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2009a) there may be no more important a bilateral relation in determining the outcome of the COP15 negotiations and the future of international climate change cooperation than that of Brazil and the United States.
Bilateral cooperation between these two nation-states was instrumental to reaching the agreement to establish the innovative Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) during the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in 1997 (OBERTHÜR; OTT, 1999, p. 167; VIOLA; LEIS, 2001) . A decade later former U.S. President George W. Bush and current Brazilian President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva signed the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Brazil to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels to foster investment in the production of low carbon, renewable transportation fuel production, namely ethanol and biodiesel, and lessen GHG emissions while sidestepping the ongoing commercial conflict over the U.S. tariff on Brazilian ethanol (LANGEVIN, 2008) . In March of 2009, recently elected U.S. President Barack Obama welcomed President Lula to the White House to call attention to his proposed Energy Partnership for the Americas, highlight the importance of U.S.-Brazil bilateral relations, and underscore each government's commitment to deepen cooperation on "clean energy" to confront the perils of global warming.
While much attention has been paid to U.S.-Brazil relations and the bio-fuel question (see LANGEVIN; BAEZA, 2009 for a review), few have fully examined the potential arc of bilateral cooperation on energy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions as the world prepares for the COP15 negotiations.
2 Accordingly, The | 11 Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ... (2009, p. 18) finds the bilateral relationship deficient in these policy areas and suggests,
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The potential for productive collaboration may be even greater in the areas of climate change, environmental protection, and energy sources. Brazil is widely regarded as an important international actor in each area, and has committed itself to actively engaging all of them. Moreover, since Obama became president, these issues have become prominent on Washington's global agenda-substantially expanding the opportunities for U.S. cooperation with Brazil and other countries. The U.S. is coming back to the negotiating table to construct a new international regime to address climate change. This new initiative is combined with a significant effort to de-carbonize its economy, change its energy matrix, and adapt its industrial base. For Brazil, it is of great interest to accompany these changes and prepare itself for the opportunities that arise through bilateral, regional, and multilateral initiatives, with an emphasis on energy (CAVALCANTI; BONOMO, 2009, p. 1). 3 Under the tent of Copenhagen, there may be no better moment for accelerating bilateral cooperation to reduce GHG emissions. The Obama administration has already set in motion measures to place "green" energy policies and programs as the cornerstone to a new era of economic development (HOUSER; MOHAN; HEILMAYR, 2009) and Brazil continues to march toward the centerstage of international energy and climate change politics (ISBELL, 2008; SENNES; NARCISO, 2009 ). Yet, there are important differences between these pivotal countries that complicate bilateral cooperation and undermine efforts to achieve international consensus on a post-Kyoto Protocol regime for reducing GHGs and ushering in a new era of sustainable development based on renewable and low carbon energy. How do the citizens and elected leaders of these two nations think differently about global warming and the challenge of reducing GHGs? Do they Mark S. Langevin share sufficient cognitive understanding of the challenges and possible solutions to expand bilateral cooperation and play a decisive, shared role in galvanizing an international agreement to address global warming?
This article does not propose that the cognitive dimension of policymaking determines climate change policy. Rather, variation in the ways that citizens and policymakers understand problems and develop solutions stem from the distributional conflicts over the costs and benefits of domestic policies and the national obligations arising from international treaty negotiations. Cognitive expressions; the observable comments and perspectives offered by citizens, journalists, and policymakers to explain, advocate or justify particular policy preferences and strategic positions for international treaty negotiations; offer an accessible and comparative range of observations for study. Such expressions compose a country's cognitive dimension of policymaking, one of many arenas through which the distributional conflict is waged, and eventually won by a coalition of factional interests. Thus, this examination of the cognitive dimension of climate change policy making in Brazil and the United States serves to expose several, but not all of the key differences between these two countries, differences that can be effectively observed and analyzed thereby contributing to a broader understanding of climate change policymaking and the possibilities for cooperation between these two pivotal players in the global efforts to meet the challenge of global warming.
This comparative policymaking study is framed by Putnam's (1988) international negotiation and ratification theory and partly informed by Bazerman's (2009) "barriers to acting in time. " Putnam proposes that national governments, such as Brazil and the U.S., hold distinct "win-sets" for international treaty negotiations, such as those of the COP15 to extend the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012. Each national government's win-set is composed of strategic positions that reflect a national distribution of costs and benefits among particular private or "factional" interests and that the winning coalition of beneficiaries can deliver domestic ratification. For Putnam, international negotiations include bargaining between national negotiators, called Level I, and bargaining among domestic factional interests which determine the win-set and possibilities of ratification; this is referred to as Level II. Putnam's framework steers investigation toward a deeper understanding of the bargaining dynamic between two or more nation-states | 13 Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ... by seeking explanation of a given national government's win-set and prospects for ratification at Level II. Accordingly, successful Level I negotiations between government negotiators identifies points of "overlap" between national win-sets and thereby frame international agreements which can be ratified at home without defection. Although Putnam argues that when national governments hold broad "win-sets" the probability of reaching agreement at Level I increases in proportion to the overlapping strategic positions held by the negotiators, he also notes that government negotiators who appear to hold large win-sets may get "pushed around" due to their capacity to make greater concessions to reach agreement. In this respect, the cognitive expressions of citizens and policymakers in Brazil and the U.S. contribute toward the formation of national strategic positions and winsets, as well as frame international perceptions about the size and flexibility of each country's respective win-set. The first section examines public opinion in Brazil and the U.S. with respect to the environment, global warming, and efforts to address climate change. The second section explores newspaper coverage and editorials as cognitive expressions that reflect and shape public opinion, contour the policy debate, and interact with the distributional conflicts over the costs and benefits of particular policy preferences and strategic positions. The third section reviews statements made by policymakers, including executive branch officials and key legislative leaders responsible for developing national energy climate change policy, that serve to crystallize and frame the cognitive dimension of policymaking as well as limit the range of viable policy alternatives.
Public opinion
Public opinion can play a role in shaping the outcome of international negotiations over global warming and climate change, especially as it interacts with scientific knowledge (AÍMOLA; DIAS, 2007) . Hence, the variation in cognitive | 15 Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, jan Brazil's cognitive dimension of policymaking parallels the country's pursuit of economic development, but increasingly within a sustainable framework. U.S. climate change and energy policymaking is challenged by a much wider spectrum of cognitive expressions, largely fragmented by ideological and partisan divisions. This important difference is crystallized through the observed variation in public opinion between Brazil and the U.S., disclosing the formidable obstacles to achieving bilateral cooperation based on common concern.
Citizens of Brazil and the U.S. think very differently about the environment, global warming, and the need to lessen GHG emissions. According to the Pew Center's Global Attitude Surveys, during the last decade Brazilians have demonstrated an increasing interest in environmental protection. From 2002 to 2007, the number of Brazilian respondents expressing concern for environmental problems grew from twenty, 20, to forty-nine, 49, percent. U.S. respondents expressing the same level of concern grew from twenty three, 23, to thirty seven, 37, percent during the same period. While both countries demonstrated increasing worry over the environment, Brazil's rising preoccupation with environmental degradation was the largest of the Pew Center's forty seven nation-state sample during the period under study. The U.S. level of concern was considerably lower than those held by Brazilians, and much lower than the sample's European countries with comparable levels of economic development including: France, Italy, Sweden, and Spain, as well as South Korea and Japan in Asia.
The 2009 Pew Center Global Attitudes Project's survey (PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2009b) follows up with this public opinion based investigation of national variation in concern over global warming and its consequences. Table one reports response rates to the Pew Center's question about concern for global warming. This table reports the proportion of respondents who either answered that global warming is a serious problem or not a problem at for Brazil and the U.S., as well as China (who had the lowest level of concern). Brazil led the sample with ninety, 90, percent stating that global warming is a serious problem; while only forty four, 44, percent of the U.S. respondents held such a belief. Interestingly, while Brazil's concern with global warming and the environment has grown in remarkable fashion since 2002; U.S. worry over this global problem actually decreased three percent since 2007 and ranked among the lowest levels of concern in the Pew Center's twenty five country sample (PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2009b). A second question asked in the Pew Center's survey asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: People should be willing to pay higher prices in order to address global climate change. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ...
Here the Brazilian and U.S. responses converge, although Brazilians report higher levels of willingness to pay the costs of reducing GHG emissions at forty eight, 48, percent to the U.S. level of forty one, 41, percent. Both the Brazilian and U.S. "agree" response levels converge around the median (47.84%) for the sample, with China (88%) and India (85%) reporting the highest levels and Egypt (18%) and Jordan (15%) responding with the low points in the sample's range. In addition to these results, The Pew Center reports that Brazilians expressed a much higher level of agreement with the statement, "Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs, " at seventy nine percent as compared to the U.S. rate of sixty four percent (PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2009b, p. 88) . Given the disparities in overall development it is surprising that Brazilians are more willing that U.S. citizens to make sacrifices to protect the environment and address global warming.
The Pew Center's Global Attitudes Project surveys (2002, 2007, 2008, 2009b ) reveal significant variation in public opinion on the environment and global warming between Brazilian and U.S. citizens. This essential difference in cognitive expression is doubled sided. Since 2002 Brazilians have expressed a growing concern for the environment and climate change that has developed into a strong national consensus that global warming is one of the world's most important challenges. In stark contrast, U.S. public opinion reveals only moderate concern over the environment and a relatively low level of agreement that global warming is a serious problem. U.S. citizens' preoccupation with global warming trails most of those nations with similar levels of economic development, and more importantly, ANDI's detailed analysis also documents the propensity to report on "global warming, " rather than other aspects of the climate change problematic and notes that in eighty percent, 80%, of the sampled publications the scientific confirmation of the green house gas effect was taken for granted (2009, p. 29) . Consequently, ANDI reports that only 9.5 percent of the sampled texts offered divergent perspectives on the topic, with 44.2 percent focused on mitigation strategies and 28.4 percent detailing the scope of climate change (2009, p. 31) . In reviewing ANDI's findings and the existing research literature treating the Brazilian media, Gonçal-ves (2008, p. 11) 
concludes that
These coverage patterns demonstrate the media's growing preoccupation in amplifying its daily agenda on climate change issues […] mostly from a pedagogical, didactic framework in order to make this complex policy issue more accessible to the majority of the population.
ANDI's findings contribute to a better understanding of the rapid shift in public opinion observed by the Pew Center's Global Attitudes Survey and the consolidation of a strong consensus supporting climate change action among Brazilians. Taken together, the sheer increase in reporting, the tendency to confirm the scientific findings on global warming, and the near absence of divergent opinions on the anthropogenic sources of GHG emissions in the pages of Brazilian newspapers serve to cultivate consensus and set a cognitive foundation among Brazilians that promotes high levels of concern and political support for vigorous mitigation policies.
U.S. news coverage is remarkably different than the Brazilian case. Several studies and investigative reports confirm that while coverage has expanded in recent years it has presented a mixed view on the science of global warming, questioned the anthropogenic sources, and highlighted and associated the partisan rancor and political division over the issue with "scientific uncertainty". Boykoff and Boykoff (2004, p. 126) .study the interaction between the "prestige" press, including the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, and propose that prestige press coverage of global warming is not just a collection of news articles; it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by news articles. The parameters of this social relationship are defined, in large part, by the | 21 Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, jan Boykoff and Boykoff (2004, p. 129) found that during the sampling period of the U.S. prestige press, from 1988-2002, the majority (52.65%) of coverage in the US prestige press, balanced accounts prevailed; these accounts gave ''roughly equal attention'' to the view that humans were contributing to global warming, and the other view that exclusively natural fluctuations could explain the earth's temperature increase. This supports the hypothesis that journalistic balance can often lead to a form of informational bias.
These researchers conclude that
In light of the general agreement in the international scientific community that mandatory and immediate action is needed to combat global warming, US prestige-press coverage has been seriously and systematically deficient (BOYKOFF; BOYKOFF, 2004, p. 134).
Several other studies reveal the important correlation between newspaper coverage in the U.S., public opinion, and partisan-political division on the issues of global warming and climate change. Antilla (2005) also found similar results in a large sample of news coverage on the science of climate change wherein journalistic norms of "balance" led to the dissemination of misinformation from skeptics, often associated with the coal and petroleum industries. She reports, Not only were there many examples of journalistic balance that led to bias, but some of the news outlets repeatedly used climate skeptics-with known fossil fuel industry ties-as primary definers. Worse yet, in some instances, such articles originated from wire or news service providers (including newspapers that provide such services or are affiliated with news service agencies)-which caused the exponential spread of misinformation (ANTILLA, 2005, p. 350). Kuha (2009) also explores U.S. media coverage since the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia with a focus on those articles that recognize the anthropogenic sources of global warming. Kuha (2009, p. 9) carefully documents the increasing recognition of climate change science and the anthropogenic sources of global warming by the press since the Bali conference.
However, in comparing this trend with the United Kingdom, Kuha (2009, p. 11) . concludes that U.S. news coverage lags behind in the amount of coverage given to global warming, including causes and effects, while giving greater attention to climate "contrarians" who seek to sow uncertainty and skepticism rather than address the merits of the science and possible policy solutions. In a similar vein, The New York Times noted that the passage of WaxmanMarkey in the House was a "remarkable achievement, " but cautioned that if the U.S. Senate cannot approve similar legislation then the country would be left with an outdated energy policy and the planet would be stuck with steadily rising emissions […] The world is waiting for the United States, after years of indifference, to take a strong leadership role. So is the American public (WASHINGTON POST WAXMAN-MARKEY..., 2009).
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Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ... The kicker, of course, is that, assuming carbon dioxide emissions caused by human beings cause global warming -still more theory than fact -the highly respected Institute for Energy Research has estimated that the controls in this bill would reduce the global temperature by one-half of 1 degree Fahrenheit. Not very impressive. skeptical of the science, the Register also complained, Not only will this bill do little or nothing to curb global warming -it's all pain and no gain -it has become a Christmas tree for politically to reduce GHGs. Moreover, increasing coverage in Brazil seems to encourage more and more policymakers, both those supportive of the Lula administration and those opposed to it, to propose increasingly rigorous policy alternatives to limit GHGs and deforestation. In the U.S., the debate over global warming in the pages of the press further fragments public opinion and undermines effective policymaking to address climate change both at home and through international negotiations.
Policymakers
These major differences between Brazil and the U.S. are crystallized through a concise review of the positions and perspectives offered by these two countries' leading policymakers in the executive and legislative branches. Brazilian government leaders largely agree on the importance of climate change as a framework for developing public policy while their U.S. colleagues are engulfed in the partisan enmity between Democrats and Republicans whereby climate change is a strong correlate of party identification and voting behavior rather than a common cause shared across political ideologies and parties. This is not to suggest that Brazilian policymakers agree on the best set of policy prescriptions or even negotiating strategies for the COP15. Rather, most Brazilian political parties and policymakers now compete among themselves to champion the issues of climate change and sustainable development. President Lula's recent remarks demonstrate the race to herald the environment as a national cause. At a speech given at the Ministry of the Environment in August of 2008, President Lula reminded his audience that, | 25 Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ... Brazil will certainly carry out all of its responsibilities to preserve the Amazon and combat global warming because our nation wants to not only assume our responsibilities, but also to exercise sovereignty over all of our Amazon territory, over all of our national decisions […] To destroy it would be an instrument used against our nation and our products (SILVA, L., 2008). President Lula's administration has worked to balance its drive for national eco- Brazil is willing to contribute to the global effort to address the climate change challenge in proportion to its historic responsibility. Hence, we have a series of policies and programs that are effectively reducing greenhouse gas emissions and making the Brazilian energy matrix cleaner, with lower levels of GHG emissions by unit of energy produced and consumed (MIGUEZ, 2009 ).
Brazil's Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, also committed the country to reducing GHG emissions, but singled out the U.S. as a major detractor in the global effort to address global warming, Those historically responsible for greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere must stop preaching and set the example. Annex I countries must have new and more ambitious legally-binding emission reduction targets. It is extremely worrying that some developed countries do not appear to be heading towards meeting their targets under the Kyoto Protocol even as the biggest emitter [the U.S.] still refuses to join the Protocol. Nor have these countries complied with their commitments on financial assistance and technology transfer under the Convention… Brazil, for its part, is ready to enhance its policies and programs to reduce emissions in a way that is measurable, verifiable and open to universal periodic review. We invite other developing nations, in a position to do so, to follow the same path (AMORIM, 2007 
He argues,
It is essential that we solve our biggest environmental and political problem that we confront inside our national borders, deforestation in the Amazon. Our environmental Achilles heel is the burning of the forest and illegal deforestation (THAME, 2008) .
Deputy Thame also weighs in on the Lula administration's objections to mandatory emission reductions under a post-Kyoto Protocol agreement, arguing, By refusing to adopt mandatory emission reductions, Brazil, along with China and India, contribute to reinforcing the Bush administration's position that justifies inaction by | 27 Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ... opposing voluntary reductions for developing countries and mandatory financial contributions paid by Annex I countries (THAME, 2008, p.1). In sharp contrast to the U.S., the Brazilian executive and legislature are mo- With a nation ready to be led on this issue and an international community waiting for the United States to finally stand up, the next president has a pivotal opportunity to shift course and take bold, broad action. His or her first mission must be to implement a serious, mandatory climate program at home, not only because the United States is a dominant producer of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, but also because it will have no international credibility unless and until it acts decisively at home (STERN, 2007, p. 175-176) .
The Obama administration has assembled a prominent team of climate change policy makers, including Todd Stern to lead the U.S. delegation at We don't want [to be] divisive, we don't want anything partisan out of this. It's not a partisan issue. This is an issue that ought to be based on science, on facts, on economics, and on good environmental policy -good economic policy, may I add significantly. I mean, this bill is really a bill for the transformation of the American economy. This bill is about jobs -clean energy jobs that stay here in America, that pay people decent salaries. (KERRY, 2009 Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ... citizens on these vital issues of global importance and international leadership.
Thinking Copenhagen
Brazil's cognitive foundation provides a sturdy, popular platform for those advocating more aggressive national policies to mitigate GHG emissions and widen this nation's win-set of strategic positions at the COP15 negotiations. The Brazilian government's insistence that developed countries, especially the U.S., do more to mitigate GHG emissions, is echoed by nearly every congressperson and executive branch policymaker. However, the country's policy debate of climate change and Cophenhagen has yet to fully incorporate the impact of the new oil reserve discoveries that could lead to Brazil's exportation of crude oil and petroleum products in the coming years. These new discoveries could lead to greater interna- Where are the possibilities for further bilateral cooperation on the road to Copenhagen? While Brazil and the U.S. do not share sufficient cognitive understanding to drive negotiations toward an historic breakthrough at Copenhagen, their strategic positions may overlap on particular issues that could frame a post-Kyoto Protocol regime. Should Brazil commit itself to emission reduction | 31 Univ. Rel. Int., Brasília, v. 7, n. 1, p. 9-37, jan./jun. 2009 Thinking Copenhagen: the cognitive dimension of climate change policy ... Brazil's broad win-set, partially defined through its strong consensus favoring international climate change action, provides the Lula administration with the flexibility of forging an historic agreement at Copenhagen. Yet, given the limits to U.S. win-set at Copenhagen, Brazilian negotiators will need to carefully focus and craft the country's negotiating positions to parallel the political possibilities of the U.S. Senate and budge the U.S. toward those points of overlap that maximize the dissemination of low carbon, low cost technologies that provide Brazil and the rest of the developing world an opportunity to bundle sustainable economic development with the multilateral effort to address global warming.
Pensando Copenhague: a dimensão cognitiva do "fazer" político da mudança de clima no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos Este artigo explora a dimensão cognitiva do "fazer" político da mudança de clima no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos, já que ambos se preparam para a Conferência Quadro de Mudanças Climáticas das Nações Unidas ou COP15, em Copenhagen. A análise política comparativa é baseada no modelo de Putnam (1988) , utilizada por Bazerman (2009), mas adaptada para explorar expressões cognitivas do "fazer" político por meio de investigação da opinião pública, cobertura jornalística e classe política. A análise revela diferenças chave nos modos que cidadãos,
